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1 Introduction
The evaluation of social situations involving risk has been a debated topic ever since
Harsanyi (1955) published his theorem on utilitarianism. He interpreted his theorem
as vindicating utilitarianism. But an equivalent interpretation is that this is an impos-
sibility theorem for those who would like to give some priority to the worst-off. If one
wants to incorporate such priority in the evaluation criterion, one must relax one of
Harsanyi’s central postulates, social rationality or Pareto.1
Fleurbaey (2010) has argued that the Pareto principle in risky contexts is not as
compelling as in riskless contexts, because when individuals take risks, by definition
they are not fully informed about the final consequences of their choices. Therefore,
Fleurbaey has proposed to restrict the application of the Pareto principle to riskless
situations and to risky situations that involve no inequalities ex post. With such restric-
tions, one obtains a class of criteria that compute the expected value of the “equally
distributed equivalent” (EDE) utility.2 Any degree of inequality aversion can be put in
the EDE function. In the extreme, the expected value of the lowest utility, or expected
maximin, is such a criterion. A leximin refinement, which lexicographically examines
the expected value of utility at successive ranks in the distribution, is also characterized
in Fleurbaey (2010).
Unlike the standard leximin criterion, which is subgroup separable, the expected
leximin criterion is unfortunately highly non-separable across individuals. If Robinson
wants to climb a tree, this is fine if he is worse-off than Friday in all states of nature,
or better-off in all states of nature. But if he may be better-off or worse-off than
Friday depending on whether he falls from the tree or not, his adventure decreases the
expected value of the lowest utility. One therefore sees that the evaluation depends on
the utility level of Friday, even when Friday is on the other side of the island, totally
unconcerned.
A natural question which then arises is whether introducing some requirement of
separability imposes serious restrictions on the degree of inequality aversion that can
be incorporated in the expected EDE criterion. More generally, the tension between
the Pareto principle, inequality aversion, and separability that is highlighted in this
literature deserves further scrutiny in the direction of having some separability with
perhaps less inequality aversion, and possibly less of the Pareto principle.
Our results show that the outlook of the tension is rather complex and involves a
fourth consideration, namely the domain of admissible individual utilities. It is possible
to introduce a substantial form of separability and retain an arbitrarily high degree of
inequality aversion, but provided the utility domain is specific (and narrower, the
1 On the interpretation of the implications of Harsanyi’s theorem, see Weymark (1991) and Broome (1991).
For a defense of Paretian (“ex ante”) criteria that evaluate the distribution of individual expected utilities
with some inequality aversion, see, e.g., Diamond (1967) and Epstein and Segal (1992). For a defense of
rational (“ex post”) criteria that compute the expected value of an inequality averse social welfare function,
see, e.g., Adler and Sanchirico (2006) and Fleurbaey (2010).
2 The equally distributed equivalent (Atkinson 1970) of a given distribution of utility is the level of utility
that, if enjoyed uniformly by all individuals, would yield the same social welfare as the contemplated
distribution.
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greater the inequality aversion). For standard utility domains (e.g., the positive real
line), the degree of inequality aversion is quite limited.
Interestingly, in all configurations, it is shown that the functional form of the social
welfare function must take a simple multiplicative form. Finally, we also show that
separability may come in conflict with the Pareto principle when it takes a slightly
stronger form.
The definition of separability for risky prospects is a delicate issue. Consider the
following prospects, described by matrices in which a cell gives the utility of an
individual in a particular state of the world (rows are for two individuals, columns
for two equiprobable states). An egalitarian with even a weak degree of inequality
aversion would like the social ordering to satisfy
(
0 1
0 1
)
preferred to
(
1 0
0 1
)
,
because individual expected utilities are the same and less inequality ex post is obtained
in the preferred prospect. The second individual faces the same personal prospect in
both social prospects. If full separability were applied, one could arbitrarily change
this “unconcerned” individual’s prospect in order to obtain
(
0 1
1 0
)
preferred to
(
1 0
1 0
)
,
in contradiction with the same egalitarian rationale. This example shows that full sepa-
rability would make it impossible to be sensitive to the correlation between individual
utilities.
One must therefore be cautious and consider only weaker forms of separability. In
this paper, we restrict the application of separability to unconcerned individuals who
bear no risk. Changing their riskless prospect cannot then affect the correlation of
their payoffs with the others. We consider two forms of separability. In the main one
studied here, social preference is not altered if one changes the prospect of unconcerned
riskfree individuals. In the stronger variant, social preference is not affected if one
removes or introduces individuals who are unconcerned and riskfree.
This paper is related to two other papers. In a more specific model with successive
generations facing a risk of utility and a risk of extinction, Bommier and Zuber (2008)
study a condition of independence with respect to the utility of the past generations
[that is called “independence of the utilities of the dead”, following Blackorby et al.
(1995)]. This condition is similar to ours because in their model, the past generations
are unconcerned and bear no risk.
Bommier and Zuber, however, restricted the Pareto principle to situations in which
risks are independent across individuals and assumed that the evaluation relied on
expected social welfare. Here, in contrast, we restrict Pareto to riskless and to egalitar-
ian situations, and, as far as social rationality is concerned, we only assume that social
evaluation satisfies statewise dominance (except in one result). Because of this differ-
ence, we obtain different functional forms that do not satisfy their Pareto condition,
although the multiplicative structure is similar. Interestingly, however, we actually
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retrieve their criterion in the discussion of the stronger condition of separability, with
a variant of the Pareto principle that applies to situations in which only one individual
takes a risk. Finally, another difference between the two papers is that we consider a
more general class of utility domains and this opens new possibilities.
The other related paper is Fleurbaey et al. (2010), which also introduces this form
of separability with respect to unconcerned and riskfree individuals, but focuses on
a different issue, namely the possibility to let the evaluation of ex post consequences
depend on fairness in the distribution of ex ante prospects. This has strong implica-
tions on the application of statewise dominance, which then becomes a very weak
rationality condition. This other paper also does not assume that the ex ante evaluation
of individual prospects, in the application of the Pareto principle, is made in terms of
expected utility.
A connection between separability and inequality aversion has also been made in a
different setting by Foster and Shneyerov (2000). In the context of inequality measure-
ment, they study the problem of defining within-group inequality either directly or as
the difference between total inequality and between-group inequality. For a specific
definition of within-group and between-group inequality, they show that this “path
independence” property entails subgroup separability and moreover pinpoints a spe-
cific member of the generalized entropy class. Formally, our separability property
is weaker, and we obtain a class of social orderings which allows for some limited
variations of inequality aversion.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the framework. The
axioms and our main result are presented in Sect. 3. The implications for inequality
are examined in Sect. 4. Section 5 studies the stronger form of separability. The final
section concludes. An appendix, made available on the authors’ website, provides
further material about the results of Sects. 4 and 5.
2 The framework
The framework is the same as in Fleurbaey (2010). The population is finite and fixed,
N = {1, . . . , n}. The set of states of the world is finite, S = {1, . . . , m}, and the eval-
uator has a fixed probability vector π = (πs)s∈S , with ∑s∈S πs = 1. This probability
vector corresponds to the evaluator’s best estimate of the likelihood of the various
states of the world. We therefore abstract from the problem of aggregating beliefs.
Given that what happens in null states can be disregarded, we simply assume that
πs > 0 for all s ∈ S. Vector inequalities are denoted ≥,> and  as usual.
The evaluator’s problem is to rank prospects U = (U si )i∈N ,s∈S ∈ Rnm , where U si
describes the utility attained by individual i in state s. Let X ⊆ R be an interval (not
necessarily bounded) and L = Xnm denote the relevant set of prospects over which
the evaluation must be made. The social ordering (i.e., a complete, transitive binary
relation) over the set L is denoted R (with strict preference P and indifference I ).
Let Ui denote (U si )s∈S and U s denote (U
s
i )i∈N . Let [U s]denote the riskless prospect
in which vector U s occurs in all states of the world. Two subsets of L must be singled
out: Lc will denote the subset of riskless prospects (i.e., U s = U t for all s, t ∈ S);
Le will denote the subset of egalitarian prospects (i.e., Ui = U j for all i, j ∈ N ). For
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two prospects U, U˜ ∈ L and a subset Q ⊂ N , let (UQ, U˜N\Q) denote the prospect V
such that Vi = Ui for all i ∈ Q and Vi = U˜i for all i ∈ N \ Q.
The utility numbers U si are assumed to be fully measurable and interpersonally
comparable. They may measure any subjective or objective notion of advantage that
the evaluator considers relevant for social evaluation. It is assumed that, for one-
person evaluations, the evaluator considers that the expected value EUi = ∑s∈S πsU si
correctly measures agent i’s ex ante interests. We also assume that for every s ∈ S, the
vector U s fully describes the relevant features of the final situation occurring in state
s. Thus, the social preferences over final situations need not be state dependent. This
means that U s is deemed better than V s in state s if and only if [U s]R [V s]. In other
words, there is no need to introduce preferences over final consequences as they are
equivalent to the social ordering R restricted to riskless prospects. This is a convenient
and innocuous simplification.
3 Multiplicative and additive criteria
We now introduce some requirements that one may wish to impose on the social
ordering R. First, as explained above, there are two Pareto conditions, one for riskless
situations, the other for situations in which full equality prevails in all states of the
world.
Axiom 1 (Strong Pareto for no risk) For all U, V ∈ Lc, if Ui ≥ Vi for all i ∈ N, then
U R V . If furthermore U j > Vj for some j ∈ N, then U P V .
Axiom 2 (Weak Pareto for equal risk) For all U, V ∈ Le, if EUi > EVi for all i ∈ N,
then U PV .
Social rationality is expressed here by statewise dominance. This is a compelling
requirement. Violating it would mean that one would sometimes prefer a prospect that
is bound to generate worse consequences than another.3
Axiom 3 (Weak dominance) For all U, V ∈ L, if [U s]R[V s] for all s ∈ S, then
U R V .
The last key requirement is an independence condition, which says that the social
ranking of two prospects is independent of the level of utility of individuals who bear
no risk and have the same utility in the two prospects.
Axiom 4 (Independence of the utilities of the sure) For all U, V ∈ L and U˜ , V˜ ∈ Lc,
and for all Q ⊂ N,
(
UQ, U˜N\Q
)
R
(
VQ, U˜N\Q
) ⇐⇒ (UQ, V˜N\Q) R (VQ, V˜N\Q) .
3 Certain apparent violations of dominance seem rational (Grant 1995). If a parent would rather flip a coin
to allocate a sweet between two children than give it to one child without flipping a coin, this seems to violate
dominance because the final distribution of sweets is the same anyway. But this behavior is compatible with
dominance if, as is natural, one incorporates the fairness of the procedure in the description of the final
consequences.
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The restriction to individuals who bear no risk is important, as explained in the
introduction. If, in our model, individuals are successive generations and we interpret
the index i = 1, . . . , n as the birth date of a generation, one may want to apply
independence of the utilities of the sure to the first generations up to any particular
date. This is what Blackorby et al. (1995) and Bommier and Zuber (2008) have called
“Independence of the utilities of the dead”.4 One may object that Independence of
the utility of the sure is stronger because it applies to any subpopulation, whereas
with Independence of the utilities of the dead the unconcerned are always the past
generations. Under Anonymity, however, the two axioms are equivalent.5
Finally, we will make use of two basic axioms of anonymity and continuity.
Axiom 5 (Anonymity) For all U, V ∈ L, if there exists a bijection ρ : N → N such
that Ui = Vρ(i) for all i ∈ N, then U I V .
Axiom 6 (Continuity) For all U, V ∈ L, if (U (k))k∈N ∈ LN is such that U (k) → U
and U (k)R V for all k ∈ N, then U R V ; if V R U (k) for all k ∈ N, then V R U.
We are now able to state our main result.
Proposition 1 The social ordering R satisfies the six axioms if and only if one of the
following two statements holds:
1. For all U, V ∈ L
U R V ⇐⇒
∑
s∈S
πs
1
n
∑
i∈N
U si ≥
∑
s∈S
πs
1
n
∑
i∈N
V si . (1)
2. There exist α, β ∈ R satisfying αx + β > 0 for all x ∈ X such that, for all
U, V ∈ L,
U R V ⇐⇒ 1
α
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(αU si + β)
1
n ≥ 1
α
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(αV si + β)
1
n . (2)
Proof If the social ordering R satisfies (1) or (2), then it clearly satisfies the axioms.
Now assume that the social ordering R satisfies the axioms. Let 1n denote the
n-vector (1, . . . , 1). By Strong Pareto for no risk, for every U s ∈ Xn, there exists
a, b ∈ X such that [b1n] R
[
U s
]
R [a1n] . By Continuity, there exists x ∈ X such that
[x1n] I
[
U s
]
. By Strong Pareto for no risk, it is unique. This value of x defines the
EDE function e (U s) . By Anonymity, e is symmetric. By Strong Pareto for no risk,
it is increasing in each argument. By definition, it satisfies e(x, . . . , x) = x for all
x ∈ X.
4 Independence of the utilities of the dead is an important principle in intergenerational ethics. In the
certainty case, it corresponds to Postulate 3b of Koopmans (1960) as discussed by Asheim Mitra and
Tungodden (2012) who defend recursive social welfare objectives defined by this Postulate and a stationarity
condition. These principles, however, apply to situations with an infinite number of generations. This infinite
population case raises specific issues as discussed by Lauwers (2012). We do not address these issues in
the present paper.
5 The reader can in fact check that in the proof of Proposition 1, only Independence of the utilities of the
dead is actually used.
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By Weak dominance, for all U ∈ L, U I (e (U 1) , . . . , e (U m)) . The quantity∑
s∈S πse(U s) belongs to X because X is an interval. By Continuity and Weak Pareto
for equal risk, one must have
(
e
(
U 1
)
, . . . , e
(
U m
))
I
[(∑
s∈S
πse(U s)
)
1n
]
.
Therefore, by transitivity and Strong Pareto for no risk, for all U, V ∈ L, U R V ⇐⇒∑
s∈S πse(U s) ≥
∑
s∈S πse(V s).
The remainder of the proof is closely related to a similar result by Keeney and
Raiffa in the case of multidimensional risks (Keeney and Raiffa 1976, Th. 6.1, p. 289).
Let u∗ be an arbitrary number in X . Let eˆ be the function defined as eˆ ≡ e − u∗,
which implies eˆ(u∗, . . . , u∗) = 0. By definition, the function eˆ is symmetric, and for
all U, V ∈ L, U R V ⇐⇒ ∑s∈S πs eˆ(U s) ≥ ∑s∈S πs eˆ(V s).
Independence of the utilities of the sure tells us that, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, for
all U ∈ Lc and all V, V˜ ∈ L:
∑
s∈S
πs eˆ(U s1 , . . . ,U
s
i , V
s
i+1, . . . , V
s
n ) ≥
∑
s∈S
πs eˆ(U s1 , . . . ,U
s
i , V˜
s
i+1, . . . , V˜
s
n )
⇐⇒
∑
s∈S
πs eˆ(u
∗, . . . , u∗, V si+1, . . . , V
s
n ) ≥
∑
s∈S
πs eˆ(u
∗, . . . , u∗, V˜ si+1, . . . , V˜
s
n ).
Because vNM utility functions are unique up to an increasing affine transformation,
there must exist two functions fi and gi such that:
eˆ(U s1 , . . . ,U
s
i , U
s
i+1, . . . ,U
s
n ) = fi (U s1 , . . . ,U si ) + gi (U s1 , . . . ,U si )
× eˆ(u∗, . . . , u∗, U si+1, . . . ,U sn ), (3)
where gi (U s1 , . . . ,U
s
i ) > 0 for all (U
s
1 , . . . ,U
s
i ) ∈ Xi .
Define a1 ≡ f1, b1 ≡ g1, and, for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}, ai (U si ) =fi (u∗, . . . , u∗, U si ) and bi (U si ) = gi (u∗, . . . , u∗, U si ), and an(U sn ) = eˆ(u∗, . . . , u∗,
U sn ). Equation (3) implies that, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}:6
eˆ(u∗, . . . , u∗, U si , U
s
i+1, . . . ,U
s
n ) = ai (U si ) + bi (U si )eˆ(u∗, . . . , u∗, U si+1, . . . ,U sn ).
(4)
Repeated applications of Eq. (4) yield:
eˆ(U s1 , . . . ,U
s
n ) = a1(U s1 ) + b1(U s1 )
(
a2(U s2 ) + b2(U s2 ) (. . .)
)
= a1(U s1 ) +
n∑
i=2
ai (U si )
i−1∏
j=1
b j (U sj ).
6 In the case i = 1, the equation is eˆ(U1s , U2s , . . . , Uns ) = a1(U1s ) + b1(U1s )eˆ(u∗, U2s , . . . , Uns ).
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Using the normalization condition eˆ(u∗, . . . , u∗) = 0 in Eq. (4), we also obtain
that ai (U si ) = eˆ(u∗, . . . , u∗, U si , u∗, . . . , u∗) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} (the same is
also true for an by definition). Therefore, by symmetry of eˆ, all the functions ai are
the same (increasing) function φ, such that φ(u∗) = 0.
The symmetry of the function eˆ also implies that, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}:
eˆ(U s1 , . . . ,U
s
i , U
s
i+1, . . . ,U
s
n ) = eˆ(U s1 , . . . ,U si+1, U si , . . . ,U sn ).
Using Eq. (4) applied to (u∗, . . . , u∗, U si , U si+1, u∗, . . . , u∗) and ai ≡ φ , this yields,
for all (U si , U
s
i+1) ∈ X2:
φ(U si ) + bi (U si )φ(U si+1) = φ(U si+1) + bi (U si+1)φ(U si ). (5)
If U si = u∗, we obtain bi (U si ) = 1. If U si and U si+1 are both different from u∗, we
obtain:
1 − bi (U si )
φ(U si )
= 1 − bi (U
s
i+1)
φ(U si+1)
.
Therefore there exists a constant ki =
(
bi (U si ) − 1
)
/φ(U si ) for all U
s
i , or equivalently,
bi (U si ) = 1 + kiφ(U si ). Note that we need bi (x) > 0 for all x ∈ X and therefore
1 + kiφ(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X .
Symmetry also implies that:
eˆ(u∗, . . . , u∗, U si , U
s
i+1, u
∗, . . . , u∗) = eˆ(U si , U si+1, u∗, . . . , u∗),
so that φ(U si ) +
(
1 + kiφ(U si )
)
φ(U si+1) = φ(U si ) +
(
1 + k1φ(U si )
)
φ(U si+1) and
therefore ki is equal to a given constant k for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. In the end, we
obtain that:
eˆ(U s1 , . . . ,U
s
n ) = φ(U s1 ) +
n∑
i=2
φ(U si )
i−1∏
j=1
(
1 + kφ(U sj )
)
(6)
There are two cases.
Case 1: k = 0. In this case, (6) implies that eˆ(U s1 , . . . ,U sn ) =
∑
i∈N φ(U si ), so that
e(U s1 , . . . ,U
s
n ) = u∗+
∑
i∈N φ(U si ). Note that the condition 1+kφ(x) > 0 is always
satisfied in that case. The condition e(x, . . . , x) = x impliesφ(x) = (x−u∗)/n, which
yields (1).
Case 2: k = 0. In this case, (6) can be rewritten
1 + keˆ(U s1 , . . . ,U sn ) = 1 + kφ(U s1 ) +
n∑
i=2
kφ(U si )
i−1∏
j=1
(
1 + kφ(U sj )
)
=
n∏
i=1
(
1 + kφ(U si )
)
,
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so that
eˆ(U s1 , . . . ,U
s
n ) =
1
k
(
n∏
i=1
(
1 + kφ(U si )
) − 1
)
,
and e(U s1 , . . . ,U sn ) = u∗ + eˆ(U s1 , . . . ,U sn ). The condition e(x, . . . , x) = x implies
φ(x) = 1/k
(
(kx + 1 − ku∗)1/n − 1
)
, so that
e(U s1 , . . . ,U
s
n ) =
1
α
∏
i∈N
(αU si + β)
1
n + u∗.
where α = k and β = 1 − ku∗. The condition 1 + kφ(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X implies
that we must have αx + β > 0 for all x ∈ X . This yields (2). unionsq
The first possibility highlighted in this result is unappealing to an egalitarian because
it features standard utilitarianism. The second possibility makes it possible to introduce
inequality aversion, but this partly depends on the value of the parameters α, β. We
study this issue in the next section.
4 Transfer principle and inequality aversion
Inequality aversion, or equivalently, priority for the worse-off, may be captured by
requiring the social ordering to satisfy the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. If i’s
prospect strictly dominates j’s prospect in every state of the world, making a transfer
of utility from i to j in every state (without reversing their relative positions) improves
the social prospect.7
Axiom 7 (Multidimensional transfer principle) For all U, V ∈ L, if there exist i, j ∈
N and δ ∈ Rm++ such that
Ui = Vi − δ  Vj + δ = U j ,
and for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}, Uk = Vk, then U P V .
Proposition 2 The social ordering R satisfies the same axioms as in Proposition 1,
with Anonymity replaced by Multidimensional transfer principle, if and only if one of
the three following statements holds true:
1. There exists a scalar ε ∈ R++ satisfying εx + 1 > 0 for all x ∈ X and such that
for all U, V ∈ L,
U R V ⇐⇒
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(εU si + 1)
1
n ≥
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(εV si + 1)
1
n . (7)
7 For a comparison of various multidimensional versions of the Pigou-Dalton principle, see Diez et al.
(2007).
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2. There exists a scalar ε ∈ R++ satisfying εx − 1 > 0 for all x ∈ X and such that
for all U, V ∈ L,
U R V ⇐⇒
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(εU si − 1)
1
n ≥
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(εV si − 1)
1
n . (8)
3. X ⊂ R++ and for all U, V ∈ L,
U R V ⇐⇒
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(U si )
1
n ≥
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(V si )
1
n . (9)
Proof One can easily check that the proposed social welfare functions satisfy all the
axioms. For the multidimensional transfer principle, this follows from the fact that the
transfer δs improves the distribution in every s ∈ S.
By Lemma 1 proven below, R satisfies Anonymity. Proposition 1 is therefore valid
under the current list of axioms, so that either (1) or (2) holds.
Consider (1) first. When U and V are defined as in the Multidimensional transfer
principle, it is clear that
∑
s∈S πs 1n
∑
i∈N U si =
∑
s∈S πs 1n
∑
i∈N V si , therefore the
axiom cannot be satisfied.
For the case (2), if β = 0 we can rewrite:
U R V ⇐⇒ 1
α
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(αU si + β)
1
n ≥ 1
α
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(αV si + β)
1
n
⇐⇒ sign(α)
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(
sign(α)εU si + sign(β)
) 1
n
≥ sign(α)
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(
sign(α)εV si + sign(β)
) 1
n ,
where ε = |α| / |β|. There are four subcases, depending on sign(α) and sign(β).
Now, considering U, V ∈ Lc, we obtain that U R V ⇐⇒ ∑i∈N φ(U si ) ≥∑
i∈N φ(V si ), where φ(x) = sign(α) ln (sign(α)εx + sign(β)). On Lc, Multidi-
mensional transfer principle implies the usual Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, which
is satisfied if and only if φ is a strictly concave function. This is the case here only
when sign(α) > 0, which leaves us with the two possibilities (7) and (8), depending
on the sign of β.
If β = 0, one then has
U R V ⇐⇒ sign(α)
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(sign(α)U si )
1
n ≥ sign(α)
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(sign(α)V si )
1
n ,
and here again the Multidimensional transfer principle implies sign(α) > 0, which
yields (9). unionsq
Lemma 1 If the social ordering R satisfies Strong Pareto for no risk, Continuity, Weak
Dominance, Independence of the utilities of the sure, and Multidimensional transfer
principle, then it satisfies Anonymity.
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Proof In virtue of the Debreu-Gorman theorem, by Strong Pareto for no risk, Inde-
pendence of the utility of the sure, and Continuity, there exist continuous increasing
functions (ϕi )i∈N such that for all U, V ∈ Lc,
U R V ⇐⇒
∑
i∈N
ϕi (U si ) ≥
∑
i∈N
ϕi (V si ),
where any s can be taken.
By Lemma 2 stated below, Multidimensional transfer principle implies that the
functions (ϕi )i∈N are identical up to a constant. As the constants play no role in the
ordering, there is no loss of generality in taking the functions (ϕi )i∈N to be identical.
This means that Anonymity is satisfied over Lc. By Weak Dominance, Anonymity is
then satisfied over the whole set L. unionsq
Lemma 2 If an ordering over Xn, where X ⊂ R is an interval, is represented
by
∑n
i=1 ϕi (xi ) , where each ϕi is a continuous function, and satisfies the Pigou-
Dalton transfer principle (for all i, j, x < x ′, 0 < δ ≤ (x ′ − x) /2, ϕi (x + δ) +
ϕ j
(
x ′ − δ) > ϕi (x)+ϕ j (x ′)), then it satisfies anonymity (for all i, j, x, x ′, ϕi (x)+
ϕ j
(
x ′
) = ϕi (x ′) + ϕ j (x)).
Proof Suppose that anonymity is not satisfied. There exist u, v such that ϕi (v) +
ϕ j (u) < ϕi (u) + ϕ j (v) .
Without loss of generality, let us assume u < v and let 
 = v − u. Let k ∈ N. The
Pigou-Dalton transfer principle imposes that for every t = 0, ..., k − 2,
ϕi
(
u + t + 1
k


)
+ ϕ j
(
u + t + 1
k


)
> ϕi
(
u + t
k


)
+ ϕ j
(
u + t + 2
k


)
.
Summing over t , one obtains
ϕi
(
u + k − 1
k


)
+ ϕ j
(
u + 1
k


)
> ϕi (u) + ϕ j (u + 
) .
Taking the limit when k → ∞, and invoking the continuity of the functions, one
obtains ϕi (u + 
) + ϕ j (u) ≥ ϕi (u) + ϕ j (u + 
) ,i.e., ϕi (v) + ϕ j (u) ≥ ϕi (u) +
ϕ j (v), a contradiction. unionsq
Looking at the proof, it is worth noting that the result would not be changed if we
used a weaker axiom making only simple Pigou-Dalton transfers in riskless situations.
The stronger axiom has been introduced here because it is worth checking that it can
be satisfied in this context. We also show in the online Appendix A.1 that our seven
axioms are independent (in the sense that each one is required to get the result).
Social welfare functions satisfying the transfer principle are said to be inequality
averse. It remains to study how much inequality aversion is compatible with formulae
(7) and (8). To that effect, we will compare the inequality aversion of the contem-
plated orderings with that of benchmark orderings. It is enough to focus on riskless
prospects, and we can therefore rely on standard concepts of unidimensional inequality
measurement. We have the following standard method to compare inequality aversion:
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Definition 1 A social ordering R is more inequality averse than a social ordering R˜
if, for all U ∈ Lc and V ∈ Lc ∩ Le, U R V ⇒ U R˜ V .
In the case of social orderings represented for riskless prospects by symmetric addi-
tive social welfare functions
∑
i∈N φ(U si ), there are standard results indicating that
the more concave the function φ, the more inequality averse the social ordering. When∑
i∈N φ(U si ) takes the classical isoelastic form
1
1−α
∑
i∈N (U si )1−α, it is convenient
to measure its degree of inequality aversion by α.
Clearly, all the social welfare functions in the families (7) and (8) are more inequality
averse than the social ordering represented by the utilitarian social welfare function
(1), which has a degree of inequality aversion equal to 0.
One can also compare them with the social ordering represented by (9), which is
for sure prospects ordinally equivalent to
∑
i∈N ln U si and has a degree of inequality
aversion equal to 1. We obtain the following results:
Proposition 3 1. Social welfare functions from family (7):
(a) Are more inequality averse the larger ε.
(b) Become ordinally equivalent to (1) when ε → 0 and to (9) when ε → +∞.8
2. Social welfare functions from family (8):
(a) Are less inequality averse the larger ε.
(b) Become ordinally equivalent to (9) when ε → +∞.
(c) Are more inequality averse than 11−α
∑
i∈N (U si )1−α, for a given α > 1, if
0 < εx − 1 < −1/ (1 − α) for all x ∈ X.
Proof 1.a. As indicated above, a social ordering represented by ∑i∈N φ(U si ) is more
inequality averse than a social ordering represented by
∑
i∈N φ˜(U si ) if and only if there
exists a concave function ψ such that φ = ψ ◦ φ˜. Let ϕε(x) = ln(εx + 1). On riskless
prospects, (7) is ordinally equivalent to ∑i∈N ϕε(U si ). One has ϕε(x) = ψε,ε′ ◦ϕε′(x),
where the function ψε,ε′(z) = ln
(
(ε/ε′) exp(z)+ 1 − ε/ε′) is strictly concave if
ε > ε′. Then the social ordering on riskless prospects represented by
∑
i∈N ϕε(U si ) is
more inequality averse than the social ordering represented by
∑
i∈N ϕε′(U si ).
1.b. When ε → 0, (εx + 1)1/n ≈ 1 + εx/n. Therefore, the function∑
s∈S πs
∏
i∈N (εU si + 1)
1
n becomes ordinally equivalent to
∑
s∈S πs
∑
i∈N U si .
The function
∑
s∈S πs
∏
i∈N (εU si + 1)
1
n is ordinally equivalent to
∑
s∈S πs
∏
i∈N
(U si + 1/ε)
1
n , which tends to
∑
s∈S πs
∏
i∈N (U si )
1
n when ε → +∞.
2.a. Let χε(x) = ln(εx − 1). With a similar argument as for point 1, one shows
that the social ordering represented by
∑
i∈N χε(U si ) is more inequality averse than
the social ordering represented by
∑
i∈N χε′(U si ) if ε < ε′.
2.b. When ε → +∞, the argument is similar as for (7).
2.c. One has χε(x) = ln(ε [(1 − α) z] 11−α − 1) whenever z = 11−α x1−α. The
function ψε,α(z) = ln(ε [(1 − α) z] 11−α − 1) is strictly concave if ε [(1 − α) z] 11−α −
1 < −1/ (1 − α) for all z. unionsq
The families (7) and (8) seemingly cover a wide range of attitudes toward inequality.
However, the social welfare function represented by (7) is well defined on (subsets of)
8 It is permissible to let ε → +∞ only if inf X ≥ 0.
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the interval (−1/ε,+∞) while the social welfare function represented by ( 8) is well
defined on (subsets of) the interval (1/ε,+∞). So the form of the set X will constrain
possible degree of inequality aversions. A noteworthy configuration is the following:
Corollary 1 If X = R++, (0, a] or (0, a) (where a ∈ R++), ∑i∈N ln U si is the most
inequality averse social ordering satisfying the seven axioms.
To obtain a greater inequality aversion, a further restriction of the domain is
required:
Corollary 2 A social ordering satisfying the seven axioms is more inequality averse
than 11−α
∑
i∈N (U si )1−α, for a given α > 1, if and only if X ⊂
(
1
ε
, 1
ε
α
α−1
)
and it
belongs to family (8).
Therefore, although in theory any positive degree of inequality aversion can be sur-
passed by social orderings satisfying the seven axioms, this may require a calibration
of individual utilities which squeezes them into a tiny interval. More precisely, the
greater the degree of inequality aversion one wishes to put into social evaluation, the
more difficult it may be to measure utilities in a reasonable range. Whether the evalu-
ator is free to rescale utility numbers before applying a formula like (8) is a delicate
issue that depends on what utility is supposed to measure.
5 Separability versus Pareto
Another problematic consideration is that, even though the utility of the past genera-
tions can be ignored in the application of the social orderings highlighted in Proposition
2, the number of individuals in society, and therefore in the past generations, still plays
a role in the computation. One might want to have independence not just of the utility
of the sure, but of the existence of the sure.
If one combines independence of the existence of the sure with Weak Pareto for
equal risk, one obtains the following stronger version of Weak Pareto for equal risk,
that applies to the subgroup of concerned individuals independently of its size.
Axiom 8 (Weak Pareto for subgroup equal risk) For all U, V ∈ Le and U˜ ∈ Lc, and
for all Q ⊂ N, if EUi > EVi for all i ∈ Q, then
(
UQ, U˜N\Q
)
P
(
VQ, U˜N\Q
)
.
As shown in Fleurbaey (2010), this axiom brings us back into the grip of Harsanyi’s
utilitarianism. In the context of the EDE criteria studied in this paper, it seems that we
cannot allow more separability than permitted by independence of the utility of the
sure.
But this may become possible if Weak Pareto for equal risk is abandoned or modi-
fied. Consider the following weakening of Weak Pareto for subgroup equal risk (and
of Weak Pareto for equal risk), where the group of concerned individuals may be
restricted to a subset of possible subgroups of N .
Axiom 9 (Weak Pareto for restricted subgroup risk) There exists Q ⊂ 2N \ ∅ such
that for all U, V ∈ Le and U˜ ∈ Lc, and for all Q ∈ Q, if EUi > EVi for all i ∈ Q,
then
(
UQ, U˜N\Q
)
P
(
VQ, U˜N\Q
)
.
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This axiom encompasses cases of particular interest. When N ∈ Q it implies Weak
Pareto for equal risk. When Q contains all singleton sets, the axiom covers situations
in which one individual takes risks that do not affect the other members of the society.
One could argue that choices for such individual risks should be respected.
The point of introducing this axiom is to make it possible to study what sets Q
are compatible with combining this axiom with other axioms. In this way, one can
analyze the extent of separability that is permitted by the approach. To do so, we need to
strengthen our rationality requirements to remain within the scope of expected utility
theory (see the online Appendix A.2 for details). We therefore make the following
assumption, which implies both Continuity and Weak Dominance.
Axiom 10 (Expected utility hypothesis) For all U, V ∈ L, there exists a continuous
function F unique up to positive affine transformations such that
U R V ⇐⇒
∑
s∈S
πs F(U s) ≥
∑
s∈S
πs F(V s).
Using this axiom, we obtain the following characterization result.
Proposition 4 The social ordering R satisfies Strong Pareto for no risk, Indepen-
dence of the utilities of the sure, Multidimensional transfer principle, Weak Pareto for
restricted subgroup risk, and Expected utility hypothesis if and only if one of the three
following statements holds true:
1. There exists q ∈ {1, . . . , n} and ε ∈ R++ satisfying εx + 1 > 0 for all x ∈ X and
such that for all U, V ∈ L,
U R V ⇐⇒
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(εU si + 1)
1
q ≥
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(εV si + 1)
1
q . (10)
2. There exists q ∈ {1, . . . , n} and ε ∈ R++ satisfying εx − 1 > 0 for all x ∈ X and
such that for all U, V ∈ L,
U R V ⇐⇒
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(εU si − 1)
1
q ≥
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(εV si − 1)
1
q . (11)
3. X ⊂ R++ and there exists q ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that for all U, V ∈ L,
U R V ⇐⇒
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(U si )
1
q ≥
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(V si )
1
q . (12)
Proof By Expected utility hypothesis,U R V ⇐⇒∑s∈S πs F(U s) ≥ ∑s∈S πs F(V s),
and F is continuous. By the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 1, Strong Pareto
for no risk, Independence of the utilities of the sure, and Multidimensional transfer
principle imply that the function F must be increasing and symmetric.
Thus, we obtain an equivalence similar to (3) in the proof of Proposition 1. Fur-
thermore, F can be normalized so that F(u∗, . . . , u∗) = 0 like function eˆ in the proof
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of Proposition 1. Using Independence of the utilities of the sure, we can proceed as in
the proof of Proposition 1 to obtain that:
F(U s1 , . . . ,U
s
n ) = φ(U s1 ) +
n∑
i=2
φ(U si )
i−1∏
j=1
(
1 + kφ(U sj )
)
(13)
where φ is a continuous and increasing function such that 1 + kiφ(x) > 0 for all
x ∈ X .
The fact that F is symmetric means that R satisfies Anonymity. By Anonymity, if
Q ∈ Q, so does every subgroup of size |Q| . Let q be a particular size that is admitted
in Q. There are two cases.
Case 1: k = 0. In this case, Weak Pareto for restricted subgroup risk, applied to
subgroups of size q, implies that
∑
s∈S
πsqφ(U si ) ≥
∑
s∈S
πsqφ(V si ) ⇐⇒
∑
s∈S
πsU si ≥
∑
s∈S
πs V si .
As VNM functions are unique up to an increasing affine transform, there must exist
α ∈ R++ and β ∈ R such that qφ(x) = αx + β. Therefore
U R V ⇐⇒
∑
s∈S
πsU s ≥
∑
s∈S
πs V s (14)
Case 2: k = 0. In this case, Eq. (13) can be rewritten:
F(U s1 , . . . ,U
s
n ) =
1
k
(
n∏
i=1
(
1 + kφ(U si )
) − 1
)
.
Hence, Weak Pareto for restricted subgroup risk implies that:
∑
s∈S
πs
1
k
(
1 + kφ(U si )
)q ≥ ∑
s∈S
πs
1
k
(
1 + kφ(U si )
)q ⇐⇒ ∑
s∈S
πsU si ≥
∑
s∈S
πs V si .
Applying the same reasoning as above, there must exist α ∈ R++ and β ∈ R such
that 1k (1 + kφ(x))q = αx + β.
When β = 0, it is necessary that kx > 0 in order to have 1 + kφ(x) > 0. Then
1+ kφ(x) = (kα)1/q x1/q if k > 0, and (−kα)1/q (−x)1/q if k < 0. Therefore, either
X ⊂ R++ and
U R V ⇐⇒
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(
U si
)1/q ≥ ∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(
V si
)1/q (15)
or X ⊂ R−− and
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U R V ⇐⇒ −
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(−U si )1/q ≥ −
∑
s∈S
πs
∏
i∈N
(−V si )1/q .
The latter case is excluded by Multidimensional transfer principle.
When β = 0, it is necessary that k (αx + β) > 0. One has
1 + kφ(x) = [k (αx + β)]1/q
= |βk|1/q
[(
sign(k)α
|β| x + sign(βk)
)]1/q
.
This gives us four possibilities, depending on sign(k) and sign(βk). As in the previous
paragraph, we need k > 0 to satisfy the transfer axiom, which leaves us with the two
possibilities (10) and (11). unionsq
The criteria highlighted in Proposition 4 are closely related to the classes of criteria
(7), (8) and (9). Indeed, as far as the analysis of inequality aversion is concerned, they
induce the same results as in Proposition 3.
As far as Weak Pareto for restricted subgroup risk is concerned, the analysis is clear
and rather negative. Only one group size can be admitted.
In the case q = 1, Pareto for q group risk collapses to a property of Pareto for indi-
vidual risk: the risk preferences of the individual are respected if all other individuals
are indifferent and bear no risk. In this case, the criteria in (11) exactly correspond
to the multiplicative social welfare functions satisfying “risk equity” in Bommier
and Zuber (2008). It is worth noting that their multiplicative social welfare functions
satisfying “catastrophe avoidance”,9 which would correspond to case 3 in the proof
(ε < 0, εx + 1 > 0 for all x ∈ X ), are ruled out by the transfer principle. They did
not find the social welfare functions displayed in (11) or (12) because they assumed
that X ⊂ R+ and 0 ∈ X , which excludes these two cases.
Let us now come back to the idea of independence of the existence of the (uncon-
cerned) sure. The criteria listed in Proposition 4 all satisfy this property fully, with no
restriction on the size of the concerned or the unconcerned subgroups. They are there-
fore strongly separable. Their limitation is on the side of the Pareto principle, as they
satisfy Pareto only when the concerned subgroup has a particular size. In particular,
they fail Pareto for equal risk unless q = n.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that social rationality (embodied in Weak Dominance)
and a reasonable dose of the Pareto principle (Pareto for no risk, Pareto for equal
9 Risk equity and catastrophe avoidance are two principles introduced in Keeney (1980). The former is
the principle that, when individuals face independent risks of a specific damage (accident), inequalities
in their probabilities of damage are undesirable. The latter principle seeks to minimize the risk of having
a large number of fatalities. Keeney showed that the two principles are antinomic, because the best way
to avoid a catastrophe is to concentrate the risk on a few (sacrificed) individuals. In an intergenerational
setting with uncertain existence of future generations, Bommier and Zuber (2008) show that risk equity
(resp., catastrophe avoidance) induces a low (resp., high) social discount rate.
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risk) can be reconciled with inequality aversion and some independence with respect
to unconcerned individuals bearing no risk. In particular, the Nash product has been
singled out as the social ordering giving the most priority to the worst-off in the relevant
case where the utility possibility set is the positive real line.
In the context of the evaluation of social situations involving risks, this already
constitutes some progress. Indeed, in view of the results involving Independence of
the utilities of the sure (or “the dead”) in Bommier and Zuber (2008), or the results
involving Pareto for subgroup equal risk in Fleurbaey (2010), one might have feared
that the degree of inequality aversion would be severely constrained. Our results open
a wider range of possibilities.
Truly enough, the tension between social rationality, Pareto, inequality aversion,
and separability remains substantial, as epitomized in Proposition 4.
To conclude, we briefly mention two solutions to this tension. One is to restrict the
set of possible prospects L and not simply the utility possibility set X . The ex post
generalized Gini criteria introduced in Fleurbaey (2010), for instance, can satisfy the
full Pareto principle and strong separability properties (including Independence of the
existence of the dead), in an intertemporal setting, if the successive generations’ utility
is always increasing in all possible worlds.
Another solution is to reject separability in the context of risk even more than
considered in this paper.10 The Robinson-Friday parable of the introduction can be
turned into an argument against separability. In absence of risk, it is natural to focus
on the worst-off among the concerned individuals only, implying that the separable
leximin criterion is more appealing than the non-separable maximin. In the presence
of risk, in contrast, an unconcerned and risk-free individual who is the worst-off either
in all states or in no state can similarly be neglected, but an individual who is the
worst-off in some states only cannot similarly be neglected, because his utility level
affects the probability distribution of the lowest utility. We leave the study of the
weaker separability conditions that this argument might suggest for future research.
References
Adler, M.D., Sanchirico, C.W.: Inequality and uncertainty: theory and legal applications. Univ. Pa. Law
Rev. 155, 279–377 (2006)
Asheim, G.B., Mitra, T., Tungodden, B.: Sustainable recursive social welfare functions. Econ. Theory 49,
267–292 (2012)
Atkinson, A.B.: On the measurement of inequality. J. Econ. Theory 2, 244–263 (1970)
Blackorby, C., Bossert, W., Donaldson, D.: Intertemporal population ethics: critical-level utilitarian princi-
ples. Econometrica 63, 1303–1320 (1995)
Bommier, A., Zuber, S.: Can preferences for catastrophe avoidance reconcile social discounting with inter-
generational equity? Soc. Choice Welf. 31, 415–434 (2008)
Broome, J.: Weighing Goods. Equality, Uncertainty and Time. Blackwell, Oxford (1991)
Diamond, P.A.: Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparison of utility: comment.
J. Polit. Econ. 75, 765–766 (1967)
Diez, H., Lasso de la Vega, M.C., de Sarachu, A., Urrutia, A.M.: A consistent multidimensional general-
ization of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle: an analysis. B.E. J. Theor. Econ. (2007). doi:10.2202/
1935-1704.1408
10 We thank the referee for suggesting this conclusion.
123
692 M. Fleurbaey, S. Zuber
Epstein, L.G., Segal, U.: Quadratic social welfare functions. J. Polit. Econ. 100, 691–712 (1992)
Fleurbaey, M.: Assessing risky social situations. J. Polit. Econ. 118, 649–680 (2010)
Fleurbaey, M., Gajdos, T., Zuber, S.: Social rationality, separability, and equity under uncertainty. CORE
discussion paper, no 2010/37 (2010)
Foster, J.E., Shneyerov, A.A.: Path independent inequality measures. J. Econ. Theory 91, 199–222 (2000)
Grant, S.: Subjective probability without monotonicity: or how Machina’s mom may also be probabilistically
sophisticated. Econometrica 63, 159–189 (1995)
Harsanyi, J.: Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics and interpersonal comparisons of utility. J. Polit. Econ.
63, 309–321 (1955)
Keeney, R.L.: Equity and public risk. Oper. Res. 28, 527–534 (1980)
Keeney, R.L., Raiffa, H.: Decision with Multiple Objectives, 1999th edn. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge (1976)
Koopmans, T.C.: Stationary ordinal utility and impatience. Econometrica 28, 287309 (1960)
Lauwers, L.: Intergenerational equity, efficiency and constructibility. Econ. Theory 49, 227–242 (2012)
Weymark, J.A.: A reconsideration of the Harsany-Sen debate on Utilitarianism. In: Elster, J., Roemer, J.E.
(eds.) Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being, pp. 255–320. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
and Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, Paris (1991)
123
